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THE PLACE OF CONGLOMERATES AND
CONGENERICS IN BANKING
PETER M. GUTMANN*
Since the passage of the Bank Holding Company Act of 19561 on May
9th of that year, conglomerates have been able to enter or remain in bank-
ing, practically speaking, only through the vehicle of the one-bank holding
company. The 1956 Act required holding companies owning 25 percent or
more of two or more banks, with certain exceptions, to register with the
Federal Reserve Board. Registered bank holding companies could not own
a nonbank subsidiary unless the Board determined that the subsidiary's
activities were "so closely related to the business of banking or of managing
or controlling banks as to be a proper incident thereto . 2. "
Financial congenerics are firms active in several related areas of finance. 3
Banks which diversify into financially related fields via the one-bank holding
company or financial firms not in banking which diversify into banking
using the same vehicle are financial congenerics. Since the ability of a bank
to diversify directly into financially related fields is very much circumscribed
by the national and state banking regulatory authorities, financial con-
generics active in banking have recently chosen the one-bank holding com-
pany as the vehicle for expansion within the desired range of activities.
Exempted by the 1956 Act, one-bank holding companies have essentially
been beyond regulation by banking authorities.4 Thus, the history of con-
glomerates and congenerics in banking since 1956 is essentially the history
of one-bank holding companies. 5
There has been a very substantial increase in the number of one-bank
holding companies since the passage of the 1956 Act. At the end of 1955,
* Professor of Economics and Finance, The Bernard M. Baruch College of the City
University of New York. A.B., Williams College, 1950; M.A., Columbia University, 1952;
Ph.D., Harvard University, 1957.
1 Act of May 9, 1956, ch. 240, 70 Stat. 133, as amended, 12 U.S.C. § 1841 et seq. (Supp.
IV, 1968).
2 Hall, Bank Holding Company Regulation, 31 So. ECON. J. 346 (1965). See also
ASSOCIATION OF REGISTERED BANK HOLDING COMPANIES, BANK HOLDING COMPANY FACTS-
1969 (1969); ASSOCIATION OF REGISTERED BANK HOLDING COMPANIES, COMPILATION OF STATE
LAws AFFECTING BANK HOLDING COMPANIES (1966); ASSOCIATION OF REGISTERED BANK HOLD-
ING COMPANIES, THE REGISTERED BANK HOLDING COMPANY: ITS HISTORY AND SIGNIFICANCE
IN AMERICA (1969); Klebaner, The Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, 24 So. ECON. J.
313-16 (1958).
3 See Financial Congenerics, BANK STOCK Q., June 1968, at 15-19; Congress and the
Congenerics, BANK STOCK Q., Sept. 1968, at 1.
4 As of this writing (December 1969).
5 See Weiss, Bank Holding Companies and Public Policy, N.E. ECON. REV., Jan.-Feb.
1969, at 3-29. See also Upshaw, Federal Regulation of Bank Holding Companies, FED.
RESERVE BANK OF RICHMOND MONTHLY REv., Oct. 1968, at 2-5 & Nov. 1968, at 2-5; The
Changing Structure of Bank Holding Companies, FED. RESERVE BANK OF CLEVELAND ECON.
REV., Apr. 1969, at 8-11.
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there were 117 one-bank holding companies with commercial bank deposits
of $11.6 billion.6 During the next decade, the number increased, generally
among small banks, by a little more than 40 per year.7 By the end of 1965,
there were a total of 550 one-bank holding companies with commercial bank
deposits of $15.1 billion.8 Until 1968, most one-bank holding companies were
one of two types; either they were small, closely held, family controlled cor-
porations, or relatively small banks controlled by large nonbanking cor-
porationsY
The division in terms of numbers among one-bank holding companies,
as of 1967, between congenerics, conglomerates, those in banking alone, and
those which were unclassifiable was approximately in the ratio 2:2:1:2. Most
were very small. In terms of the total assets of the holding companies con-
cerned, about two-thirds of the congenerics and about one-third of the con-
glomerates had an asset size of less than $1 million. Some three-quarters of
those holding companies which could be classified had an asset size of $10
million or less and only about 9 percent had an asset size of $100 million or
more. 10
Beginning in 1968, and in a few instances even earlier, there was a
drastic change in the nature of one-bank holding company formations.1
Many of the largest commercial banks in the United States formed or an-
nounced their intention to form one-bank holding companies. As of Septem-
ber 1, 1968, there were 684 one-bank holding companies with total deposits
of $17.8 billion. By December 31, 1968, the number had only risen by seven,
but deposits had jumped by $14.1 billion. In addition, between September
1 and December 31, 1968, 76 banks with deposits of $71.8 billion announced
plans to form one-bank holding companies. Finally, during the same period,
16 institutions announced plans to purchase banks. Thus, a total of 783
one-bank holding companies with deposits of $108.2 billion had been formed
or announced by December 31, 1968. This compared to the June 1968 figure
of 106 multi-bank holding companies with deposits of $48.9 billion regis-
tered with the Federal Reserve Board. Nationally, 27.5 percent of com-
mercial bank deposits were in existing or announced one-bank holding
companies as of the end of 1968.12
6 STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON BANKING AND CURRENCY, 91ST CONG., 1ST Sns., THE
GROWTH OF UNREGISTERED BANK HOLDING COMPANIES- PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS 5 (Comm.
Print 1969) [hereinafter cited as STAFF REPORT].
7 Hearings on Bank Holding Company Act Amendments (H.R. 6778) Before the House
Comm. on Banking and Currency, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 65 (1969) (statement of Treasury
Secretary David Kennedy) [hereinafter cited as 1969 Hearings].
8 STAFF REPORT 5-7.
9 Id.
10 Data from Robert J. Lawrence, The Nature of One-Bank Holding Companies (un-
published paper in Banking Markets Section, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve System),
in Hall, Some Impacts of One-Bank Holding Companies, in FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF
CHICAGO, PROCEEDINGS OF A CONFERENCE ON BANK STRUCTURES AND COMPETITION, MAY 19
AND 20, 1969 [hereinafter cited as PROCEEDINGS].
11 BARRON'S, Mar, 24, 1969, at 11.
12 Id.
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The swift increase in the number of one-bank holding companies, and
in the size of the participating banks, combined with the number of acquisi-
tions announced, and actually consummated by major banks, raised consid-
erable concern that a major trend in finance was well under way, namely,
the formation of large bank-dominated financial congenerics and perhaps
large bank-dominated conglomerates. This concern led to hearings before
the Committee on Banking and Currency of the House of Representatives
(the Patman Committee) in April 1969,13 which resulted in a report by the
Committee on July 23, 1969, of a bill to control one-bank holding com-
panies. 14 Subsequently, on November 5, 1969, the House of Representatives
voted a considerably more stringent bill for federal regulation of one-bank
holding companies. 15 In effect, this bill would eliminate conglomerates in
the banking field and substantially restrict financial congenerics active in
banking.
There is little doubt that the rush into one-bank holding companies
began when the major banks realized that the one-bank holding company
would allow them to do indirectly what they could not do at all directly, or,
at least, could not do directly with convenience or with assurance of con-
tinued success. After all, the banks were regulated by the various banking
authorities while the one-bank holding companies were not; thus, the latter
were free to move into any areas whatever except perhaps the securities busi-
ness. The national banks had been enabled to move into several financial
and related areas connected with banking as a result of favorable rulings by
the Comptroller of the Currency, but a number of these rulings were chal-
lenged by court suits, leading to prolonged uncertainty. Moreover, by the
very nature of the legislation governing the national and the state regulatory
authorities, the regulators could never provide the scope allowed by forma-
tion of an unregulated one-bank holding company. In addition to these
considerations, any bank holding company, regulated or unregulated, could
issue commercial paper at the market rate of interest while this was impos-
sible for the banks themselves who were subject to Regulation Q.16 This
was potentially important for a number of banks, hard pressed for reserves
by the rundown of certificates of deposits due to Regulation Q, and by the
increasing cost of using the Eurodollar market combined with the subse-
quent imposition of reserve requirements on Eurodollar borrowings. 17
The rush into one-bank holding companies and the trend towards
creation of bank-dominated financial congenerics crystallized opposition to
13 1969 Hearings.
14 BANK HOLDING COMPANIES: REPORT To ACCOMPANY H.R. 6778, H. REP. No. 387,
91st Cong., ist Sess. 37 (1969).
15 See 115 CONG. REC. 10,544-74 (daily ed. Nov. 5, 1969).
16 The Federal Reserve Board announced towards the end of 1969 that most commer-
cial paper issued by bank holding companies was to become subject to Regulation Q.
17 Also, one-bank holding companies are not required to have preemptive rights and
cumulative voting for directors, while national banks are. But this factor by itself did not
cause switching to one-bank holding companies.
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this major development and generated support for regulation of one-bank
holding companies by banking authorities. The reasons for opposition to the
trend may be summarized under the following headings: (1) the creation of
bank-dominated economic power centers; (2) dangers to bank safety; (3)
unfair competition due to tied loans and reciprocal dealing; (4) unequal ac-
cess to credit; (5) changes in the boundaries of banking, leading to regula-
tory problems; (6) small town monopoly control through local bank
conglomerates; (7) new competition from banks for existing non-banking
businesses; and (8) increase in financial barriers to entry in certain non-
banking businesses.
1. The Creation of Bank-dominated Economic Power Centers
A one-bank holding company, dominated by the management of the
bank which initially created it, could acquire considerable economic power
outside the banking industry as the center of a large financial congeneric or
even as the center of a large conglomerate. In the case of the larger banks,
mammoth corporations could result. This would unquestionably reduce the
number and increase considerably the size of economic power centers in the
United States. In particular, it would also increase the concentration of
liquid assets. This argument against the formation of large bank-dominated
one-bank holding companies applies to some extent to the formation of all
large conglomerates and congenerics, but it particularly applies to banks as
developed below.' 8
The increase in the size of such economic power centers poses some
potential dangers. German banks, for example, gained great power over
industry, starting in the mid-nineteenth century. The German banks are rep-
resented on many boards of directors and control many industrial corpora-
tions, through direct ownership of stock and indirect control over stock.
This stimulated cartelization of many industries. The Japanese zaibatsu,
essentially conglomerates of immense size, provided an even more effective
concentration of economic power.19 In the United States, the unfavorable
effects of bank-dominated economic power centers would of course be less,
due to the far lesser degree of concentration of American banking as well as
the presence of the antitrust laws; but there would certainly be unfavorable
effects.
2. Bank Safety
There has been some concern that the formation of unregulated one-
bank holding companies could adversely affect the safety of the commercial
bank deposits in the affected bank. The reasons are these: (a) unwise ex-
tensions of credit to the nonbanking subsidiaries can threaten depositors'
18 See 1969 Hearings 9 (statement of Adolph A. Berle); id. at 196 (statement of the
Honorable William McChesney Martin, Jr.); id. at 350, 360-61 (statement of Peter M.
Gutmann); id. at 490, 492 (statement of B. Meyer Harris).
19 See Bronfenbrenner, The Japanese Experience, in PROCEEDINGS 95-98.
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funds; (b) some nonbanking subsidiaries of a one-bank holding company
may have difficulties or fail. In such a case, though there is no legal com-
pulsion, a strong bank affiliate may in fact support a weak nonbank affil-
iate.20 But the contrary position may also be argued: (a) Federal Reserve
member banks must have loans to their affiliates 120 percent collateralized;
(b) banks insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation may not
lend more than 10 percent of the capital assets of the bank to any one
affiliate, and 20 percent to all affiliates; (c) it is safer for a bank's depositors
if nonbank activities which may be risky are carried out via a one-bank
holding company than if they are carried out directly by the bank.
21
It must be recognized that any multi-firm organization offers the op-
portunity to shuffle assets between subsidiaries. Under some conditions, a
one-bank holding company may find it advantageous to shift the risky assets
to the bank. This is particularly so where the degree of stock ownership of
the bank is substantially less than the degree of stock ownership of the other
subsidiaries. It is far from easy for bank supervisors to prevent the risky
assets from being shifted to banks under such circumstances. 22 This may
lead to some bank safety problems.
The whole controversy over bank safety can only be understood in its
historical setting. The experiences in banking in the late 1920's and early
1930's were disastrous. Commercial banks had pursued reckless loan policies
towards their investment banking affiliates. Bank solvency suffered. As a
result, the Banking Act of 19332 was passed, requiring the separation of
commercial banking from investment banking. At the same time, the Pecora
Investigation of 1933-1934, held by the Senate Banking Committee, demon-
strated that many banking affiliates had been organized to engage in busi-
nesses prohibited to the banks themselves. With this historical background,
many critics felt that the recent evolution of the unregulated one-bank
holding company held the unpleasant potential of partially repeating the
unsatisfactory earlier history.
3. Unfair Competition Due to Tied Loans and Reciprocal Dealing
The bank affiliate of a one-bank holding company might grant credit on
condition that borrowers agree to do business with other subsidiaries of the
20 See 1969 Hearings 295, 296-97 (statement of Honorable Charles E. Bennett); id. at
633, 634, 638 (statement of William G. Dewald); id. at 733-34 (memorandmn from
Robert Pitofsky).
21 CARTER H. GOLEMBE Assoc., INC., THE NATURE AND CONTROL OF ONE-BANK HOLDING
COMPANIES 5-6 (1969).
22 Hall, Some Impacts of One-Bank Holding Companies, in PROCEEDINGS 77-78. Hall
has the following comment:
[T]here are several notable examples of chain-bank organizations in which the
owners had large equities in one affiliate and small equities in the bank. Low-
quality assets were acquired by the affiliate and sold to the bank. When the bank
went bankrupt as a result, the owners were still able to maintain the profits from
the affiliates.
Id. at 78 n.5.
23 12 U.S.C. § 21 et seq.: 18 U.S.C. §§ 493, 657, 709, 1006, 1007, 3056 (1964).
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holding company. Bank loan policy can be utilized to increase the business
of factoring, insurance, leasing, and other subsidiaries of the holding com-
pany at the expense of independent competitors. Tie-in sales which involve
bank loans and credit life insurance have existed for some time.24 The power
of a bank to persuade their loan customers to use other subsidiaries of the
bank holding company is increased when the bank has developed market
power due to a local monopoly, a strong oligopoly, or simply general tight
credit.
It may be argued that existing antitrust law adequately protects against
such practices.25 Tie-in sales of services are prohibited under the Sherman
Act, 26 but the provisions of section 3 of the Clayton Act 27 relate to com-
modities, not services. Fortner Enterprises v. United States Steel Corp.28 may
be relevant; there, the plaintiff charged that very attractive credit terms by
United States Steel had been conditioned on the purchase by the customer
of prefabricated housing material from United States Steel. The Supreme
Court, by a narrow 5-4 majority, remanded for trial the plaintiff's charge
of violation of sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. The narrowness of the
decision, the doubt about a broader applicability of the principle incor-
porated in this case and, in fact, the ambiguities in the applicability of the
antitrust laws to the services offered by banks and their affiliates in a holding
company, have caused many to support considerable restriction in the scope
of the financial banking congenerics.
4. Unequal Access to Credit
There has been considerable concern that the rapid growth of one-bank
holding companies would result in credit advantages for the affiliates of the
bank as well as their customers, and credit problems for the competitors of
the bank's affiliates. First, the competitors of the nonbank subsidiaries of
the holding company may find it more difficult to secure credit from the
bank. This is particularly serious where few or no other alternative bank
credit sources are available. These competitors may also be faced with other
problems, for example, the possible transmission to their bank-affiliated com-
petitor of information submitted to the bank in connection with a loan
application.
Second, the bank may favor the customers of its affiliates over the cus-
tomers of the competitors of its affiliates in its credit policies. This could
also have an adverse effect on bank safety, if it resulted in unsound loans.
Third, banks cannot be expected to maintain an arms length position with
borrowers who are its affiliates. In a period of tight money when credit is
24 See 1969 Hearings 196, 197 (statement of the Honorable William McChesney
Martin, Jr.); id. at 262, 265 (statement of Ralph Nader).
25 Id. at 733, 738 (memorandum by Robert Pitofsky).
26 15 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (1964).
27 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1964).
28 394 U.S. 495 (1969).
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rationed, these may have ample access to funds while their competitors do
not. However, as previously noted, all Federal Reserve member banks and
all insured banks may not lend an amount greater than 10 percent of the
capital assets of the bank to one affiliate and 20 percent to all affiliates.
Member banks must also have loans to their affiliates 120 percent col-
lateralized. These provisions greatly reduce the attractiveness of loans to
their own affiliates by the larger banks. 29 Fourth, the bank holding com-
pany can obtain more capital for its affiliates more cheaply through the open
market, than a small independent finance company, mortgage company or
other competitor of an affiliate can manage.
5. Regulatory Problems Caused by Changes in the Boundaries of Banking
Banking is a highly regulated industry. The shifting boundaries of the
banking field can cause a number of regulatory problems. First, there is the
ability of bank holding companies to issue their own commercial paper at
the market rate of interest allowing them partially and increasingly to avoid
the restrictive Federal Reserve monetary policy during 1969, by circum-
venting Regulation Q. Second, by combining firms in different industries
regulated by different sets of regulations, e.g., banking and insurance, within
the same one-bank holding company, regulatory conflicts and difficulties are
bound to occur. Third, a congeneric or conglomerate admixture of bank
and nonbank subsidiaries within the same one-bank holding company en-
hances the difficulty of supervising loans and bank solvency. To resolve this
problem, public audit powers may have to encompass all the affiliates of the
bank.
6. Small Town Monopoly Control Through Local Bank Conglomerates
In many small towns, there is only a single bank. In others, there are
two or three. Under such conditions, the market power of the bank in the
local area is often very substantial. When that bank is combined with other
local businesses through a one-bank holding company, the already extensive
local market power of the bank may be further enhanced. The local banker
may be able to use information to strengthen his bargaining position with
individuals outside the banking field. However, it may be argued that the
alternative to such small local one-bank holding company conglomerates is
not an independent bank but an absorption of the bank by a larger non-
local bank.
7. New Bank Competition for Existing Nonbank Businesses
A great deal of politically important vociferous opposition to bank con-
generics and conglomerates, and to the one-bank holding company has come
291969 Hearings 30, 506 (questions by the Honorable William Widnall); id. at 234
(discussion by Governor Robertson); id. at 493, 496, 507 (statement and discussion of
Horace Hansen).
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from businesses adversely affected by the increased competition from banks,
namely, insurance companies and agencies, travel agencies, accountants, data
processing services, etc.30
One-bank holding companies engage in a variety of different activities.
A total of 239 one-bank holding companies formed on or after January 1,
1965 were identified as of October 1969. These operated 575 nonbank sub-
sidiaries engaging in 124 different nonbank activities. The more important
were: insurance agents (120); real estate (54); insurance companies (41);
personal credit institutions (17); mortgage companies (12); finance com-
panies (10); savings and loan associations (10); and computer services(9).1
Generally, the businessmen in these fields feel that banks have many
advantages which make it difficult to compete with a bank-affiliated insur-
ance agency, travel agency, etc., on equal terms. These advantages include
unequal access to credit, tied loans and the large size of many banks relative
to the small businessmen active in the areas above. Many argue that the
move by banks into such businesses through the one-bank holding company
constitutes the use of a franchise in one field, banking, to gain advantage in
other fields.8 2
8. Increase in Financial Barriers to Entry in Certain Nonbanking
Businesses
When banks enter fields such as travel agencies, insurance agencies or
data processing services, where the great preponderance of firms are small,
their entry can precipitate an increase in the average firm size and a shake-
out of the smaller firms. The increase in average firm size comes from the
need to compete with the bank-affiliated firms, combined with the economies
of scale likely to develop in the industries concerned due to the competition
from these bank affiliates. For example, larger working capital probably will
be required to compete properly. Hence, the financial barriers to entry into
these industries are likely to rise and small businesses operating in these in-
dustries will have to grow larger.
This concludes the discussion of the reasons for opposition to the recent
rush into one-bank holding companies. As detailed below, this opposition
resulted in the framing of legislation to control one-bank holding companies,
which passed the House of Representatives in November 1969.
But why did so many substantial banks discover and make use of the
30 1969 Hearings 300-04 (statement of the Honorable Spark M. Matsumaga); id. at
524-28 (statement of Bernard Goldstein); id. at 546-50 (statement of Bruce McConnell,
Jr.); id. at 697-99 (statement of Morton V. White); id. at 788-93 (statement of William
Stringfellow); id. at 808-12 (statement of Peter H. Grimes).
31 Patman, Large Numbers of Bank Holding Companies Aided by Grandfather Clause
in H.R. 6778 as Reported, 115 CONG. REc. 9779 (daily ed. Oct. 21, 1969).
32 Congress, in 1916, amended the National Bank Act to include section 92, restricting
national banks in the sale of insurance in communities of less than 5000 population. But
this limit does not apply to single-bank holding company nonbanking subsidiaries.
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one-bank holding company device relatively recently, and within such a
short period of time? The reasons may be summarized under these headings:
(A) use of indirect methods to do what is forbidden directly; (B) the herd
instinct; (C) economies of scale; (D) loss of market share by banks to non-
bank financial institutions; (E) salary administration.
A. The Use of Indirect Methods to Do What Is Forbidden Directly
Banks are highly regulated. They are variously subject to the jurisdic-
tion of the Federal Reserve Board, the Comptroller of the Currency, the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the state banking authorities and
the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice. Many bankers have
long been concerned about the restrictions of the scope of their business
activities entailed by regulation. It is true that the definition of banking has
changed over the years. Today it includes credit cards, traveler's checks,
leasing and other activities not formerly considered part of banking. It is
also true that rulings of the regulatory authorities in areas such as data
processing, insurance and loan production offices, have broadened the scope
of banking. Nevertheless, the scope of activities which banks may carry out
directly is greatly restricted. The scope of activities which multi-bank
holding companies may carry out is also severely restricted. The one-bank
holding company device provided the perfect vehicle for banks to engage
in activities otherwise prohibited or at least very difficult. Thus, banks which
wanted to diversify through product extension, congenerics or conglomerates
found a legal vehicle to accomplish this objective.
The one-bank holding company device also has allowed banks to use
a method of financing not permitted directly, namely, the sale of commercial
paper by the one-bank holding company at market rates of interest.83 In this
manner, the bank could escape the effect of Regulation Q on bank-issued
commercial paper.3 4
B. The Herd Instinct
Why was there such a rush into one-bank holding companies by the
larger banks? Here the explanation is two-fold. First, it took someone to
show the way. The Union Bank of California, one of the major banks, did
this when it created a one-bank holding company in 1967 to acquire non-
bank businesses.35 Other major banking institutions quickly saw the signif-
icance of this development and followed it. Second, after the trend had been
established, it drew unfavorable attention from an increasing number of
critics. As a result, an even greater rush into one-bank holding companies
ensued by banks fearful of possible restrictive legislation and desirous of
coming under the protective umbrella of a grandfather clause.
53 Multi-bank holding companies, as explained previously, could also issue com-
mercial paper.
34 See note 16 supra.
351969 Hearings 900-04 (statement of Robert Volk).
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C. Economies of Scale
Banking congenerics will exhibit some economies of scale in finance,
production, sales, etc.36 Conglomerates controlled by a bank are also likely
to exhibit economies of scale in finance and perhaps in other aspects of
business operation.
First, a one-bank holding company, whether a congeneric or a conglom-
erate, will probably be able to obtain capital at a cost below that of any of
its smaller subsidiaries. Second, in the production area, there are likely to
be economies of scale in similar services offered, such as servicing a checking
account, servicing a credit card, preparing a payroll, etc. Third, when two or
more services are purchased at the same time, such as financing for a car,
credit life insurance and insurance on the car, economies of scale in sales are
the likely result. Similarly, there may be economies in advertising, research
and other business functions.
D. Loss of Market Share by Banks to Nonbank Financial Institutions
Over the years, many other financial intermediaries have gained in im-
portance relative to banks. Savings and loan associations, credit unions, and
a number of specialized financial institutions have grown more rapidly than
the commercial banks.37 In good measure this was due to exclusion of the
commercial banks from a number of financial areas, or restrictions on their
operation in these financial areas by the law and the regulatory authorities.
Hardly any businessman likes to see a loss in market share. Over the past
decade, bankers have become considerably more aggressive and adept at
broadening the scope of their business and competing with other types of
financial institutions. The one-bank holding company was the logical ex-
tension of this trend.
E. Salary Administration
Sometimes, it is best to conduct a new activity in a separate corporation
since that activity requires a different kind of talent remunerated at higher
levels. It may be difficult to achieve the requisite flexibility in salary scales
within the same corporate structure. This factor has made it desirable to
conduct some activities by means of subsidiaries of a one-bank holding com-
pany, even though they could be carried out directly by the bank.
This concludes discussion of the reasons which motivated the larger
banks to convert to one-bank holding companies. But, as we have seen al-
ready, these proved insufficient to prevent congressional action designed to
bring one-bank holding companies under the supervision of the banking
authorities.
We now turn, first, to the Bill reported by the Committee on Banking
36 Id. at 196-98 (statement of the Honorable William McChesney Martin, Jr.).
371 d. at 897-98 (statement of Samuel Stewart); id. at 674 (study of the Honorable
Richard Hanna).
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and Currency and, second, to the drastically revised Bill voted by the House
of Representatives.
On July 23, 1969, a much divided Committee reported, as amended,
H.R. 6778, a Bill to amend the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956. The
amended Bill was substantially weaker than the original measure proposed
by Wright Patman, Chairman of the Committee, and also weaker than the
administration proposals.38 The critical vote came on amendments to H.R.
6778 as it was initially proposed by Patman; these were adopted June 26,
1969 by a 20-15 vote as 5 Democrats joined 15 Committee Republicans. The
very much altered H.R. 6778 was then ordered reported on June 27, 1969 by
a 29-5 vote.39
The Committee Bill, as reported, had the following features: (a) it pro-
vided for regulation of one-bank holding companies; (b) it placed one-bank
holding companies under the Federal Reserve Board; (c) it required that
nonbanking activities of bank holding companies be "functionally related"
to banking; (d) it excluded insurance agencies (except for credit life or credit
disability insurance) and mutual funds from permissible nonbanking ac-
tivities for bank holding companies; (e) it stated that the Board could take
into consideration whether entry into a nonbanking field was de novo or by
acquisition of an existing company in determining whether entry was to be
permitted or denied; 40 (f) Board action on an application to go into any
nonbank field was required within 90 days; (g) a grandfather clause was
established with a date of February 17, 1969. The bill as reported did not
include coverage of (a) partnerships owning banks, and (b) bank holding
companies which are labor, agricultural or horticultural organizations.
On November 5, 1969, the House of Representatives, by a final roll call
of 352-24, drastically altered these provisions and voted far tougher legisla-
tion; the Senate is considering this bill in 1970.41
The bill as passed by the House did the following: (a) it provided for
regulation of one-bank holding companies; (b) it placed one-bank holding
companies under the Federal Reserve Board; (c) it required that nonbanking
activities of bank holding companies be "of a financial or fiduciary nature"
38 115 CONG. Rlc. 902-05 (daily ed. Feb. 17, 1969) (the Patman bill- H.R. 6778); A
Bill to Broaden the Definition of Bank Holding Companies, and for Other Purposes
(March 1969) (the Administration bill) (multigraphed-available from author); Com-
parative Type Showing Changes in Existing Law Made by Proposed Bill (March 1969)
(the Administration bill) (multigraphed- available from author); Treasury Department,
Summary of the Background of Development of the One-Bank Holding Company Problem
(March 1969) (comment on the Administration proposal) (multigraphed - available from
author).
39 CONG. Q., July 4, 1969, at I; AM. BANKER, July 8, 1969, at I, col. 3; AM. BANKER,
July 3, 1969, at 1, col. 3.
40 This follows a suggestion of the author in his testimony before the Committee on
Banking and Currency. See 1969 Hearings 354, 358 (statement of Peter Gutmann); see
also id. at 440-41.
41 115 CONG. Ric. 10,544-75 (daily ed. Nov. 5, 1969). See Banking Industry Reels Under
Impact of House H.C. Punch, AM. BANKER, Nov. 7, 1969, at 1, col. 1.
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and "functionally related to banking"; (d) it excluded the securities business,
insurance (either as principal or agent, except for credit life or credit dis-
ability insurance), travel agencies, accounting services, data processing (with
certain exceptions) and leasing (with certain exceptions) from permissible
nonbanking activities for bank holding companies; (e) it stated that the
Board could take into consideration whether entry into a nonbanking field
was de novo or by acquisition of an existing company, in determining
whether entry was to be permitted or denied; (f) Board action on an ap-
plication to go into any nonbank field was required within 90 days; (g) a
grandfather clause was established with a date of May 9, 1956; (h) the grand-
father clause was not to apply to any bank holding company with bank
assets of more than $30 million and nonbank assets of more than $10 mil-
lion; (i) the definition of a bank holding company was changed to one where
actual control of a bank is exercised instead of one requiring a 25 percent
stock ownership; (j) the partnership exemption was removed; (k) the labor,
agricultural or horticultural organization exemption was removed.
The bank holding company bill as passed by the House would have
severe effects on conglomerates and congenerics in banking. First, it would
render it practically impossible to have conglomerates in banking. Second, it
would restrict bank congenerics substantially in their choice of business
fields since some fields are totally excluded and all others must be "of a
financial or fiduciary nature" and "functionally related to banking," as in-
terpreted by the Federal Reserve Board. Third, it would require wholesale
divestitures, since there were only some 117 one-bank holding companies as
of the grandfather clause date, and even some of these might be required to
divest themselves of their bank or of their nonconforming nonbank affiliates.
This could have particularly severe effects on the small one-bank holding
companies. 42 Fourth, it would improve the ability of multi-bank holding
companies to broaden into financial congenerics since these registered hold-
ing companies are presently restricted to nonbanking activities which are
incidental to banking.
The conclusion is clear. Conglomerates in banking are all but finished.
Congenerics in banking will be subject to considerable restriction and reg-
ulation by the law and by the regulatory agencies.
421969 Hearings 1176-84 (statement of W. C. Hartley); id. at 1186-87 (statement of
Dick W. Stevens); Eisenberg & Monson, A Tax Man Looks at One-Bank Holding Com-
panies, BANKERS MAGAZINE, Summer 1969, at 10-14.
